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Abstract
High demand for low latency services and local data pro-
cessing has given rise for edge computing. As opposed to
cloud computing, in this new paradigm computational facil-
ities are located close to the end-users and data producers,
on the edge of the network, hence the name. The critical is-
sue for the proliferation of edge computing is the availability
of local computational resources. Major cloud providers are
already addressing the problem by establishing facilities in
the proximity of end-users. However, there is an alternative
trend, namely, developing open infrastructure as a set of stan-
dards, technologies, and practices to enable any motivated
parties to offer their computational capacity for the needs of
edge computing. Open infrastructure can give an additional
boost to this new promising paradigm and, moreover, help
to avoid problems for which cloud computing has been long
criticized for, such as vendor lock-in or privacy. In this paper,
we discuss the challenges related to creating such an open
infrastructure, in particular focusing on the applicability of
distributed ledgers for contractual agreement and payment.
Solving the challenge of contracting is central to realizing an
open infrastructure for edge computing, and in this paper, we
highlight the potential and shortcomings of distributed ledger
technologies in the context of our use case.
1 Introduction
Originally, edge computing (EC) was introduced to provide
a possibility for mobile devices to oﬄoad computation to
nearby cloudlets [59], suggesting that computational capac-
ity will not reside only in clouds but also at the edge of the
network near the end-users, hence the name. High demand
for low latency services and local data processing needed by
Internet-of-Things (IoT) [34,54] has turned EC into a versatile
new paradigm with diverse use cases and applications [62].
Naturally, since computational resources are now required in
the proximity of end-users, the question arises where those fa-
cilities will come from, and who will operate them? So far, we
can identify two major deployment trends. One is an effort by
big cloud providers to establish computational facilities near
clients/at the "edge", e.g., Amazon CloudFront [31] or Mi-
crosoft Azure Stack [53]. The alternative is building an Open
Infrastructure for Edge (OIE) suggested by [37,42,46,58,70].
Such an infrastructure will comprise of common practices,
technologies, and set of open standards that will enable any
interested parties to offer their computational capacity for pur-
poses of EC. We will refer to such parties as independent edge
providers (IEPs). Naturally, a major cloud provider can also
be an IEP, as long as their service offering conforms to the OIE
standards and practices. Establishing a viable OIE involves
addressing a number of challenges, such as the discovery
of IEPs by clients and application providers [71], common
negotiation protocol for dynamic deployment of services to
IEPs [70], migration of services to the IEP and so on. As-
suming that most of the aforementioned technical problems
can be solved, one final challenge remains, namely coming to
an agreement between the IEP and the application provider.
This may also include paying compensation to the IEP for
the use of its resources. In volatile environments, where an
edge-based application must react quickly to changes in users’
behavior, conventional electronic payment methods used in
e-commerce might not have enough agility. Moreover, both
parties will likely require a low-cost escrow service with cus-
tomizable rules since the application provider cannot be sure
whether the IEP will be able to deliver its service as promised.
Given the open nature of OIE, we see an open and decentral-
ized mechanism for achieving consensus as a natural choice,
and recent progress on distributed ledgers (DLs) makes them
an appealing candidate solution.
In this paper, we conduct a case study of using DL for the
needs and requirements of OIE. Given the variety of DLs and
other means of digital contracting, we specifically identify
the strengths and weaknesses of concrete systems for our use
case. We also investigate emerging interledger solutions that
propose to build an ecosystem utilizing multiple DLs.
The present situation is epitomized in [20]: “Blockchain
has not yet bridged the gap from core technology to actual
applications, and at this point, remains theoretical rather than
practical.” Throughout the paper, the question we investigate
is how to bridge this gap in the context of EC and what would
be an “ideal” DL for the EC? As we will show later in the
paper, the answer is not as straight-forward as assumed as
none of the existing DL systems have all the desired properties
to satisfy requirements of the OIE.
2 The Ricardian Triple
In this section, we describe two major digital contracting
techniques, namely, Smarts Contract and Ricardian Contract.
Together with parametrization, they form a Ricardian triple
which we see as a promising evolution path towards building
a DL framework that will satisfy most of the OIE needs.
Smart Contract. One trend pushing DLs beyond fiscal ap-
plications are smart contracts, introduced in [61]. Smart con-
tracts are programs that are published on a peer-to-peer (P2P)
blockchain network of miners. Users call methods of smart
contracts by posting signed transactions to the network, and
execution of such a method may alter the global state of the
system, e.g., resulting in cryptocurrency transfer from one
account to another. The execution is verified either collec-
tively by miners or by special validator nodes, and only if
the consensus is achieved changes to the state are globally
propagated.
Ethereum’s [65] implementation of smart contracts has en-
abled their wider adoption, also in the context of EC. Wright
et al. [66] propose a system where Ethereum smart contact
handles agreement between a group of edge nodes and users
running applications at them. A key feature is escrow capabil-
ity: a smart contract can freeze funds by transferring them to a
special account and release only when specific conditions are
met. Technically, when a user deploys an application to the
edge node, the contract freezes payment of user and transfers
it to the owner of the edge node only in the case that applica-
tion was executed on the edge node appropriately. In [56], the
authors present a framework where smart contracts handle
tenants of the next generation cloud [48].
The Ricardian Contract. Conceived contemporaneously to
smart contracts, the Ricardian Contract [38, 43] enables digi-
talizing the text of a legal agreement in tamper-proof fashion,
wrapping it into machine-readable form, and providing the
means to include the reference to a legal agreement in elec-
tronic transactions. Whereas smart contracts are responsible
for the automated execution of an agreement that participants
are already committed to, the Ricardian Contract represents
the legal agreement itself put into digitally protected form.
Ricardian triple. The approach in [39, 44] unifies the two
concepts above into a Ricardian triple: <prose, parameters,
code>. The prose is the digital formulation of legal agree-
ment, i.e., the Ricardian Contract; code is responsible for the
enforcement of the prose, and corresponds to a smart con-
tract; parameters bind formulation and enforcement together,
providing flexibility. In a Ricardian triple, prose, and code
form a template-like structure while parameters concretize
the particular details of the agreement.
The Ricardian triple is a promising candidate for building
a decentralized agreement framework for EC since it unites
declarative and procedural aspects of contracting. The Ricar-
dian Contract encloses a digital SLA, while the smart contract
is responsible for performance and enforcement of the SLA.
Technically, the system underneath acts as a ledger, securing
transactions and keeping the history of events. Parametriza-
tion allows for templating and negotiation: different partici-
pants may use similar agreements but negotiate custom price,
latency, and other terms of service.
3 The Requirements of OIE
We now identify the key requirements for an open infrastruc-
ture for the edge. As edge is a very broad concept, we focus
on a general set of requirements to be realized and base them
largely on modern cloud services, as those are the yardstick
against which edge computing performance is compared.
1) Speed of transaction confirmation. Effective use of EC
requires ensuring service providers similar levels of scaling
as in cloud datacenters, to meet varying demands. As edge
nodes are typically limited in capacity, horizontal scaling
is likely more common than vertical scaling. Further, we
assume service providers will engage in both active scaling,
i.e., adapting their resources on-the-fly, and passive scaling,
i.e., pre-allocating resources based on estimated needs.
2) Cost of transaction. Due to relatively low prices for cloud
VM deployments1, the transaction cost of the DL must be no
more than a negligible fraction of deployment cost itself.
3) Protection against financial volatility. A DL involves
cryptocurrency or some form of digital tokens. The value of
such tokens measured in conventional currencies is subject
to market speculation. Figure 1a displays the volatility [36]
of Ether (Ethereum token), Bitcoin and gold vs. U.S. dol-
lar (USD). Lack of willingness to buy volatile tokens poses a
threat to a wide-scale adaption of DL Technologies (DLT).
4) Privacy of transactions. Permissionless, i.e., publicly ac-
cessible ledgers, are mostly based on the blockchain, which is
visible to all parties. While IEPs are likely willing to let their
identities known, e.g., for reputation tracking, they might be
hesitant to allow the details of the transactions, e.g., price, be
publicly known. Ideally, we would like to be able to publish
the existence of transactions, while keeping the details secret
and revealed only when explicitly agreed by the IEP.
5) Accountability of participants. As an open environment,
OIE does not preclude participation of crowdsourced IEPs.
Crowdsourcing improves the availability of resources but
1AWS VM hourly ERM prices [30] may vary from $0.011 to $0.27.
poses a problem of unfair participants. The dilemma of
anonymity vs. accountability [51] that most of the crowd-
sourcing systems face must be solved in our case in favor of
accountability.
6) Escrow service and conflict resolution. For the reasons
above, we need an escrow service, transferring the payment
only in the case of appropriate service delivery by the IEP.
However, we need to handle cases when IEP and service
owners disagree on the fulfillment of SLA. The problem is
not specific for OIE and exists in modern clouds as well, but
the possibility of crowdsourcing makes the issue more acute.
Since formal verification of computation is too heavy for OIE
needs, we see some form of reputation tracking as a solution.
Thus, the DL must have the capability to store reputation
rankings in a tamper-proof fashion.
7) Legislation for digital agreement. To be effective, Ricar-
dian prose needs to have legislative status and variations in
legal systems of different countries complicate the problem
further. However, for digital contracting to be effective, we
need real-world agreement on the legal frameworks (or re-
strict services and IEPs to operate inside a single jurisdiction).
E.g., in Tennessee, there is a strong initiative by lawmakers
to accept blockchain technology for legal contracts [35].
8) Truly distributed operation without a central author-
ity. One of the goals of DL is to avoid centralized control
and explicit ownership. However, there is evidence that well-
established systems having strong community backing began
to suffer from centralization [52]. Ideally, the DL should have
an implicit mechanism preventing the centralization.
9) Environmentally sustainable operation. Figure 1b dis-
plays energy consumption [41] of Bitcoin and Ethereum;
these are similar to Portugal and Costa Rica, respectively.
Per transaction, Ethereum consumes 46 kWh, while VISA
consumes 151 kWh for 100 000 transactions [41]. For sus-
tainability, DLs used in OIE must consensus protocols other
than those in proof-of-work (PoW) [55] family.
4 Challenges of the Building Blocks
Next, we examine existing distributed ledgers, their weak-
nesses and strengths from the perspective of the requirements
formulated above. Our analysis of the DL systems is by no
means exhaustive since there are over 2000 cryptocurrencies
listed [40]; despite some of them being clones of each other
(so-called altcoins), hundreds are still unique by the tech-
nology and application niche. We include systems that have
managed to gain sufficient community support and maturity.
As we envision OIE to be an open infrastructure, we focus
purely on permissionless, i.e., open DLs. Closed or permis-
sioned DLs might in some cases offer different benefits and
disadvantages, but their further analysis is left for future study.
Support for the Ricardian Contract. The first implemen-
tation was the system called Ricardo [60], which is used by
0
5
10
15
Vo
lat
ilit
y 
In
de
x
Jan 2016 July 2016 Jan 2017 July 2017
Ether/USD Bitcoin/USD Gold/USD
(a) Volatility of Ether, Bitcoin, and gold vs. US dollar [36].
July 2017 Jan 2018 July 2018 Jan 2019
0
20
40
60
80
Es
tim
at
ed
 T
W
h/
ye
ar
Ethereum Bitcoin
(b) Bitcoin and Ethereum energy consumption [41].
Co
st 
(U
SD
)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Jan 2017 July 2016 Jan 2018 July 2016 Jan 2019
(c) Ethereum transaction fees [10].
Figure 1: Bitcoin and Ethereum infographics.
banks and other financial institutions. However, Ricardo is
not intended for P2P execution. Among modern P2P ledgers,
OpenBazaar [57] is notable for its use of the Ricardian Con-
tract. The application of the contract is extended and broken
into four phases: 1) vendor offer 2) buyer order 3) vendor
order confirmation 4) buyer receipt. This workflow would
also serve well purposes of OIE and it is easy to adopt. There
is an initiative [33] to include built-in support of the Ricardian
Contract into EOS [7, 45], one of the leading smart contract
platforms. Technically, it is feasible to incorporate the Ri-
cardian Contract into most of present DLs, especially those
having smart contract support.
Consensus protocols and scalability. Bitcoin and Ethereum
are not sustainable because of their energy-wasteful PoW [55]
consensus protocol, where miners compete with each other.
In Ethereum, the situation is further exacerbated by the need
to validate execution of smart contracts, i.e., every full node
executes all the calls to the smart contracts contained in the
block before accepting a new block. Thus, a program is exe-
cuted as many times as there are full nodes in the Ethereum
network with a sole purpose of achieving the consensus.
Recent progress has produced entire families of new con-
sensus protocols, of which proof-of-stake (PoS) family is of
particular interest for us since many DL systems already use
variants of PoS. Notably, Ethereum is planning the transition
to Casper [69], which also belongs to the PoS family. The first
Platform
Metric Transactions per
second (TPS)
Transaction
confirmation time Transaction fee
Number
of nodes
Consensus
algorithm
Ethereum 10-30 6 min $0.35 8717 PoW, moving to PoS
EOS 3000 1.5 sec $0 21 (528) DPoS
Stellar 1000 4-5 sec 0.00001 XLM† 434 SCP
TRON 748 5 min $0 1058 DPoS
Cardano 50-250 5 min 0.155381 ADA‡ NA PoS (Ouroboros)
†XLM is Stellar Lumen token, ‡ADA is Cardano token.
Table 1: Performance of platforms supporting smart contracts.
system implementing PoS was Peercoin [18], and basically,
the idea behind the protocol is to entrust block generation
to nodes having the most assets at stake, i.e., the more to-
kens node has the more trusted it is. Naturally, to prevent
the richest node from usurping control over the system so-
phisticated randomization techniques are also applied. PoS
is eco-friendly and improves the performance of a system,
e.g., transactions per second (TPS) by order of magnitude.
Delegated PoS (DPoS) [50] is used often in recent systems
(see Table 1). In this protocol, a quorum of block producers
is elected by PoS in rounds.
TrueBit [63] brings a solution for the scalability of smart
contracts by introducing the challenger role. Expressed sim-
ply, challengers will selectively examine the execution of
smart contracts and upon exposing incorrect result will re-
ceive a substantial reward. Sharding [68] is another approach
to increase throughput: a system is split in a number of
sidechains or shards, enabling parallel processing. Ethereum’s
Plasma [47] project is expected to combine sharding with
techniques of TrueBit.
Given the state of the art in consensus protocols, we con-
clude that sustainability, scalability and performance issues
are no insurmountable obstacles in broader DL adaption.
Smart contract systems. The leading platform in smart con-
tracts has been Ethereum. Despite high reliability and security
due to the large community backing, Ethereum has been criti-
cized for: i) low transaction throughput ii) long confirmation
time iii) high costs. Indeed, given metrics in Table 1, for the
time being, Ethereum is not an appropriate platform for OIE,
unless transition to Casper protocol changes the outlook.
Fortunately, the popularity of smart contracts has propelled
a rapid development of the technology, spawning new systems
that surpass successors by performance, usability, and other
characteristics. Table 1 summarizes the most prominent of
them in order of their capitalization [40].
Ethereum [65]. In practice, TPS stays around 15 transac-
tions per second. Transaction fee varies significantly depend-
ing on the congestion of the network (see Figure 1c), the value
in the table is average for January 2019.
EOS [7]. Use of DPoS protocol improves performance met-
rics compared to Ethereum. There are constantly 21 block
producers in the system. The number of candidates for pro-
ducer role may vary, and at the moment of measurement, there
were 528 candidates [8]. There is only a block reward but no
transaction fee, which is very attractive for end-users. There
was a remarkable criticism blaming the platform for security
flaws, lack of accountability, and centralization [67].
TRON [25]. DPoS platform targeted for entertainment and
content services. The platform promises zero transaction fees
and theoretically maximum TPS of 748 which in practice
stays near 20 [26].
Stellar [21]. Originally, the system shared many similari-
ties with Ripple, but now it has evolved relatively far from it.
The network is a set of servers (Stellar Cores) running Stel-
lar Consensus Protocol (SCP), which is based on Federated
Byzantine Agreement (FBA) instead of PoW or PoS. One
might consider Stellar to be somewhere on the boundary of
permissionless and permissioned DLs since anyone can set
up a Stellar Core node but if no other node in the network is
configured to trust this new node its validation opinions will
have no weight. This can be seen as a downside; otherwise,
the system’s performance is high, costs low and operation
sustainable.
Cardano [2]. As stated by its creators, the distinction of
Cardano from other DPoS platforms is that the Ouroboros
protocol is the first one of DPoS family with mathematically
proven properties. The TPS of the next version (Hydra) is
expected to be around 5000 transactions per second, due to
the usage of sharding. The transaction costs are dependent on
the size of transactions and a couple of parameters; the value
given in Table 1 is the minimal possible value [24].
Privacy. Cryptocurrencies such as ZCash [29] or Monero [15]
use publicly available encrypted ledger. Encrypted transac-
tions remain validatable due to the usage of zero-knowledge
proofs and other advanced techniques. Such a feature is ap-
pealing for OIE since many IEPs would prefer to hide their
bookkeeping from competitors while preserving accountabil-
ity. Unfortunately, at the moment neither ZCash nor Monero
support smart contracts. Dero project [5] aims to bring smart
contracts to CryptoNote [4] protocol (used by Monero). The
problem is the utilization of PoW and lack of acceptance from
the community (at present, Dero’s rank is 374 [40]). Techni-
cally, the privacy issue is solvable, e.g., AZTEC protocol [1]
is designed for the execution inside smart contracts and pro-
vides functionality similar to CryptoNote. However, present
privacy solutions are clearly lacking convenience.
Protection against volatility. Exceptionally high volatility,
i.e., unpredictable value fluctuations of cryptoassets has been
one of the major disincentives for broader take up of DLs. The
problem has opened a niche for so-called stablecoins [32].
Stablecoin is cryptocurrency which has a fixed exchange
rate with some fiat currency or another asset. The most
prominent stablecoins by their capitalization are Tether [23],
USD Coin [28], and TrueUSD [27]. Technically, these cryp-
tocurrencies run either as ERC20 [9] tokens on Ethereum or
inside Omni Layer [17] of Bitcoin (or its altcoins), thus shar-
ing all the shortcomings of the underlying network. Stable
exchange rate is guaranteed by the acquisition of real assets,
so stablecoins require some formal institutionalized entity or
private company to actually obtain and hold those assets. In
this sense, stablecoins contradict decentralization philosophy
implicit for Bitcoin and cryptotokens in general. Essentially,
stablecoins replace the risk of volatility with the risks of trust-
ing a foundation, company, or other non-governmental finan-
cial institution. There were allegations that there is no hard
evidence that dollars backing Tether actually exist [64]. To
summarize, at present there is no mechanism to protect cryp-
tocurrencies against volatility that would avoid centralization
and risks related to it.
Interledgers. The concept behind interledger technology is
to enable seamless interaction between different DLs via a
commonly defined interface or intermediary in such way, that
the end-user can utilize DL as a service, without any spe-
cific platform lock-in [49]. Interledgers also partially address
the problem of volatility and trust, since in the case client
and an IEP prefer different DL platforms, the contracting is
still possible via an interledger. In the scope of this article,
we look at Interledger Protocol (ILP) [14], Cosmos [3], and
Polkadot [19]. ILP developers emphasize using a methodol-
ogy similar to networking protocols, resulting in a layered
outcome with clearly defined interfaces and responsibilities.
From our point of view, the downside of this solution is the
relatively tight binding of its implementations to Ripple (e.g.,
Moneyd [16]), thus orienting more towards interbank trans-
actions than community-based blockchain systems. Cosmos
and Polkadot on the other hand, target blockchain developers.
They are both taking advantage of Tendermint [22] consensus
protocol and share many other similarities on both concep-
tual and technical sides. Cosmos offers Tendermint coupled
with a gossip networking engine as a building block for the
creation of new custom blockchain platforms that will com-
municate with each other easily through the Cosmos Hub.
For those systems that do not use Tendermint as a consensus
protocol (e.g., Bitcoin or Ethereum), interaction mechanism
is more complicated and involves the creation of so-called
Peg Zones (Bridges in Polkadot) with special validator nodes.
The arrangement is complex and participants have to trust
the operator of the Peg Zone. The need to trust the operator
violates the principle of decentralization. On a positive note,
according to Cosmos developers [3], Ethereum’s transition
to Casper protocol will obsolete the need for Peg Zone since
Casper belongs to the same PoS family as Tendermint. So far,
the vision of putting major DLs behind a single interface is
still a distant mirage. Nevertheless, in the case systems like
Cosmos or Polkadot will become prevalent, a Tendermint DL
will be an attractive option for the OIE.
5 Summary
In this paper, we examined the potential for edge comput-
ing to move towards OIE and formulated the requirements
that such an extensive infrastructure would demand from the
point of the contractual agreement and transaction handling.
While there are other challenges in realizing an open edge
infrastructure, such as discovery of resources and their man-
agement, those are more of a technical nature and we expect
most of them to be efficiently solvable. Contractual issues in
a large-scale, open infrastructure, on the other hand, require
a decentralized solution for managing the agreements and
consensus. Distributed ledgers seems like an attractive choice
and in this paper we focused on evaluating the suitability of
existing DLs for OIE. We ended up with a slightly negative
result since, at the time of writing, no existing system fully
satisfies the requirements that OIE would impose. This is
mainly due to the operation of present highly distributed DL
systems supporting smart contracts, e.g., Ethereum, not being
environmentally sustainable, while TPS is too low and costs
are inappropriately high.
Fortunately, the outlook for the future is promising due to
the rapid technological development in the field of DLT. As
of now, there are fully operational systems2 using smart con-
tracts or alike technology to trade computational resources.
On a broader scale, there is a trend toward the transition from
energy wasteful PoW family of protocols towards, e.g., eco-
logical PoS and other solutions alike. However, having an op-
erational, robust and reliable public DL is not only a question
of the technical solution and its implementation. Such DLs
are operated by a community, comprising of miners either pur-
suing an economic profit or volunteering for a non-monetary
cause. Fortunately, such a community already exists: as of the
moment, there are ≈ 8717 Ethereum nodes operated by min-
ers [11]. Moreover, the emergence of the new communities
backing novel systems is also highly probable. Upcoming in-
terledgers are obsoleting the need for a dominant DL solution
and, hopefully, will enable a seamless interaction between
various ledgers, diversifying the ecosystem. Thus, despite
present hindrances we believe that in the near future there
will be community-backed open systems capable of undertak-
ing the challenges of OIE, necessitating further research into
the field.
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2Golem [12], iExec [13], and DFINITY [6], just to mention a few.
6 Workshop Discussion Topics
a) What kind of feedback are we looking to receive?
We are most interested in getting feedback on the general
stance of the paper, i.e., our starting point that an open edge
infrastructure is a viable and likely deployment direction.
Much of the future of edge computing will also depend on
actual applications and any kind of feedback from people
actually running edge applications would be appreciated. Our
paper is based on the assumption that open infrastructures, like
the Internet, will eventually triumph over closed, proprietary
systems.
b) The controversial points of the paper
Distributed ledgers are very much a controversial topic and
their suitability for OIE is very much open to debate. The per-
formance of DLs is a moving target and making predictions
about their future suitability for edge computing is hard.
c) The type of discussion this paper is likely to generate
in a workshop format
We see the discussion revolving around the direction of
development for edge, i.e., will it be the monopoly of a small
number of providers or will the open edge infrastructure we
envision in this paper take over. The technical issues that need
to be solved in these two cases are very different and for the
community it would be extremely valuable to have discus-
sions on the tradeoffs inherent in either of these directions, as
well as their advantages and disadvantages.
d) The open issues the paper does not address
We do not address the use of permissioned, i.e., closed,
DLs. These could provide an interesting alternative to open,
permissionless DLs, but would bring their own tradeoffs. Also,
because of space limitations, we had to leave out several
existing DLs.
e) Under what circumstances the whole idea might fall
apart
We can see a couple of possibilities where the need for a
distributed, open edge infrastructure will not emerge, or where
there would be no need to use distributed ledgers. One, edge
computing could go the way of cloud computing or content
distribution, which are monopolized by a few large players,
obviating the need for flexible contracting. Two, distributed
ledgers might turn out to be a dead-end from a business point
of view and turn out to be unworkable. Three, commercial
entities, like VISA, could take over smart contracting via their
current infrastructures.
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